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A
STUDY OF NIGERIA TRUTH COMMISSION, AND WHY IT FAILED
ABSTRACT
This
work a astudy of Nigeria truth commission, and why it failed. With its 130 million
inhabitants Nigeria is the most populous country on the African continent. The
state was consolidated by the British in 1914 before it gained its independence
46 years later in 1960. This geographically diverse region is home to more than
350 ethnolinguistic groups (Sklar 2004: 39). Ethnic and religious cleavages
have been a source of conflict since pre-colonial time, but have been greatly
exacerbated since the military overthrew the government in 1966. The military
coup d‟état was initially considered to be a temporary corrective measure to a
civilian leadership. Questionnaires
were distributed among people from selected states in Nigeria. Interviews and
surveys were also conducted.
Primary and secondary data will be used in the
analysis.
This work discusses the factors which can explain the
failure of the Nigerian truth commission. We argue that the Oputa Panel was
never endowed with the sufficient resources and powers to investigate its
extensive mandate nor did it enjoy the governmental support necessary for the
implementation of its recommendations which included recommendations of criminal
investigations into 150 human rights crimes. The outcome can be explained by
the invasive role of the military in Nigerian politics. Military officers
remain a coherent force in Nigerian politics. They enjoy the loyalty of the
Armed Forces and remain a threat to democratic stability. By virtue of their
unique positions they have access to political decision-making channels and can
circumvent any efforts to hold the military accountable for the brutal and
systematic human rights atrocities which were committed during the military
era. explained by the invasive role of the military in Nigerian politics.
Military officers remain a coherent force in Nigerian politics. They enjoy the
loyalty of the Armed Forces and remain a threat to democratic stability. By virtue
of their unique positions they have access to political decision-making
channels and can circumvent any efforts to hold the military accountable for
the brutal and systematic human rights atrocities which were committed during
the military era.
It is therefore observed that lack of political will,
too much endemic socio-political and socio-economic corruption, amongst others
have a strong and significant effect on the progress of the Nigeria truth
commission.
The Nigeria truth commission the Oputa Panel was set
up in 1999 to investigate and recommend the appropriate redress of human rights
violations committed between 1966 and 1999. Facing several delays and dangers
of shut down the Commission finally handed over its report in May 2002. The
Nigerian government responded by annulling the Commission and consequently
refused to implement any of its recommendations.
Although restorative justice as practiced in Timor
Leste seemed to yield positive results, many scholars are cautious in their
praise of truth commissions. As van der Merwe observes: “Reconciliation is not
an event. People cannot simply one day decide that they want to forgive and
forget” (2001: 157). Although truth commissions can open up spaces where
forgiveness, personal healing and the restoration of human dignity may take
place, these sentiments are individual-driven and depend on the unique and
individual experiences of the victims. Thus when restorative justice is
promoted by bodies such as truth commissions one can question whether such private
feelings of human dignity and worth can at all be administered by an
administrative organ (Wilson 2001: 544). Hayner also recognises this point and
notes that reconciliation generally is too complex and “(...) difficult to
achieve by means of a national commission” (2001: 154).
A limitation to truth commissions and reconciliation
is their temporary nature: Truth commissions only exist for a finite period of
time. They have limited powers and resources, consequently their contribution
to reconciliation will also be limited. Reconciliation is a process and cannot
be expected to happen over night. It is in Wilson's words “wishful thinking”
that one public hearing can lead to long-lasting results (Wilson 2001: 550). A
truth commission can however “open up a public space to grapple with past
injustices” (Nesiah 2005: 283). Nevertheless “(…) a truth commission is not an
adjudicator of truth, but merely a catalyst for that dialogue” (ibid). This
dialogue is important insofar as it changes people‟s perceptions and attitudes
towards each other. This is probably all that truth commissions hope to do:
“(…) to help realise the public conditions which encourage these internal moral
transformations” (Wilson 2001: 547). Based on these observations we suggest the
following hypothesis:
Summarily, a truth
commission is more likely to contribute to reconciliation if it successfully
pursues reconciliation strategies (such as creating an account of the past
which is agreed upon to the extent that it (the past) no longer interferes with
future policy-making; and public hearings where victims and perpetrators can
meet agree to some terms of reference for future co-existence).”
As a recommendation, a truth commission must enjoy the
necessary legal powers in order to conduct exhaustive investigations and obtain
a complete picture of the past. Daly in fact considers legal powers to be one
of the two most important factors for the fulfilment of the mandate (2001: 98).[1]
Extensive search and seizure powers are considered to contribute to more
thorough investigations by giving the commission the necessary powers to call
for evidence from official sources, state archives, databases and sources
otherwise which may contribute to unearth the truth about human rights crimes.
Moreover, a truth record is likely to be more comprehensive if the
commissioners can summon witnesses to give testimony: It is not uncommon that
both victims and perpetrators are unwilling to testify (Burgess 2007).
Perpetrators will not implicate themselves in criminal activities and victims
may fear the repercussions from perpetrators or consider testifying about past
abuses to be too traumatic. In these situations a truth commission with
summoning powers can compel witness to come forward if this considered
appropriate. In cases where the danger of repercussion is real, witness
protection powers are a logical extension of a commission's legal powers.
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[1] A
truth commission can be established by the legislature (South Africa), the
executive (Chile) or through a peace agreement (El Salvador) (Freeman 2006:
28). It is important to note that the powers to imbue truth commissions with
the legal powers such as the power to “compel testimony or to search premises
and seize evidence” rests, in most states, with the legislative branch
(ibid).
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